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Abstract—New operating systems, such as the Capsicum
capability system, allow a programmer to write an application
that satisfies strong security properties by invoking security-
specific system calls at a few key points in the program.
However, rewriting an application to invoke such system
calls correctly is an error-prone process: even the Capsicum
developers have reported difficulties in rewriting programs to
correctly invoke system calls.
This paper describes capweave, a tool that takes as input
(i) an LLVM program, and (ii) declarative specifications of the
possibly-changing capabilities that a program must hold during
its execution, and rewrites the program to use Capsicum system
calls to enforce the policies. Our experiments demonstrate that
capweave can be applied to rewrite security-critical UNIX
utilities to satisfy practical security properties. capweave itself
works quickly, and the amount of runtime overhead incurred
in the programs that capweave produces is generally low for
practical workloads.
I. INTRODUCTION
Developing practical but secure programs remains a diffi-
cult, important, and open problem. Network utilities such as
tcpdump and wget process data read directly from a net-
work connection, but execute vulnerable code [1], [2]. File
utilities and language interpreters are often run by a trusted
user to process untrusted data, but also execute vulnerable
code [3]–[7]. Once an attacker compromises vulnerable code
in any of the above programs, he can typically perform any
action allowed for the user that invoked the program.
Traditional operating systems provide only weak primi-
tives for applications to manage their privileges. As a result,
if a programmer wants to verify that his program is secure,
he typically must first verify that the program satisfies
very strong properties, such as memory safety. However,
recent work [8]–[11] has produced new operating systems
that allow programmers to develop programs that execute
unmanaged code yet satisfy strong security requirements.
Moreover, programmers can develop such programs with
much less effort than fully verifying the program for a
traditional operating system. Such systems extend the set
of system calls provided by a traditional operating system
with security-specific calls (which henceforth we will call
“security primitives”). Throughout a program’s execution,
it interacts with the system by invoking security primitives
to signal key events in its execution. The developers of
such systems have manually modified applications to invoke
security primitives so that the application satisfies strong
security policies, even when the application is composed of
untrusted code.
One example of an operating system with strong security
primitives is the capability operating system Capsicum [10],
now an experimental feature in FreeBSD 9 [12]. Capsicum
allows a programmer to compartmentalize his program into
separate modules that each have a subset of the full set
of privileges, following the principle of least privilege.
Capsicum tracks for each process (1) the set of capabilities
available to the process, where a capability is a file descriptor
and an access right for the descriptor, and (2) whether the
process has the privilege to grant to itself more capabilities
(i.e., open more files). Capsicum provides to each process a
set of system calls that the process uses to limit its capabili-
ties. Thus, trusted code in a program can first communicate
with its environment unrestricted by Capsicum, and then
invoke primitives to limit itself to have only the capabilities
that it needs for the rest of its execution. Untrusted code
then executes with only the limited capabilities defined
by the trusted code. Thus, even if the untrusted code is
compromised, it will only be able to perform operations
allowed by the limited capabilities.
The Capsicum primitives are sufficiently powerful that
a programmer can rewrite a practical program to satisfy
a strong security policy by inserting only a few calls to
Capsicum primitives [10]. However, in practice it is difficult
for programmers to reason about the subtle, temporal effects
of the primitives. When the Capsicum developers first eval-
uated Capsicum, they rewrote programs, such as tcpdump,
in a way that they tentatively thought was correct, only to
discover later that the program was incorrect and required a
different rewriting [10]. Often, as in the case of tcpdump,
the difficulty results from the conflicting demands of (i)
using low-level primitives, (ii) ensuring that the program
satisfies a strong, high-level security requirement, and (iii)
preserving the core functionality of the original program.
This paper addresses the problem of writing programs for
capability systems, like Capsicum, by presenting a system,
called capweave, that takes from a programmer (1) a
program that does not invoke Capsicum primitives, and
(2) a declarative, temporal policy, stated in terms of the
capabilities that the program should hold over the course of
its execution, according to the principle of least privilege.
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capweave automatically compartmentalizes the program
and instruments it to invoke Capsicum primitives so that it
satisfies the policy when executed on Capsicum. We call the
problem of finding such an instrumentation the Capsicum
policy-weaving problem.
Our capweave policy weaver addresses two key chal-
lenges that a programmer faces when manually rewriting a
program for Capsicum. The programmer’s first challenge is
to define what “secure behavior” means for his program.
While Capsicum provides a powerful set of primitive opera-
tions, it does not provide an explicit language for describing
policies. Because the Capsicum developers did not have
such a language when first developing Capsicum, it was
impossible for them to formally define correctness for their
rewritten programs.
The programmer’s second challenge is to write his pro-
gram to be both secure and functional. A programmer can
typically secure a program on Capsicum by strongly limiting
the capabilities of the program. However, the rewritten
program may limit its capabilities too strongly at one point
of an execution, and as a result, may not have the capabilities
required to carry out core program functionality later in the
execution. The incorrect rewriting of tcpdump [10] is an
example of this issue. To resolve conflicts between security
and functionality, a programmer must typically carefully
rewrite his program to maintain additional state about an
execution, and consult the state to determine when to invoke
Capsicum primitives and execute a program function in a
process with distinct capabilities.
An additional challenge in designing capweave was
to structure it so that it uses a simple, declarative model
of Capsicum. Capsicum system and application developers
have developed and continue to develop libraries of functions
that an application can invoke to more easily manage its
capabilities [13]. For the remainder of this paper, we refer
to both the system calls and library functions that a program
invokes to manage its capabilities as security primitives.
When a Capsicum architect implements a new primitive,
he should be able to easily extend capweave so that
it can instrument programs to invoke the new primitive,
but he should not need to understand the details of the
instrumentation algorithm used by capweave.
To address the programmer’s first challenge, capweave
provides a policy language with which a programmer can
write an explicit, declarative, general policy that restricts
the privileges of the program in terms of capabilities. Each
policy is a regular expression over an alphabet of program
points paired with capabilities. The policy allows all pro-
gram executions that execute with the specified restricted
privileges.
To address the programmer’s second challenge,
capweave takes an uninstrumented program and its
policy, and automatically instruments the program to
satisfy the policy. To do so, capweave constructs from
the program, policy, and the semantics of Capsicum an
automata-theoretic safety game [14] between an “Attacker,”
who “plays” program instructions, and a “Defender” who
plays Capsicum primitives, by applying an automata-
theoretic policy weaver [15]. The Attacker wins the game if
the sequence of plays violates the policy, and the Defender
wins otherwise. capweave searches for a winning
Defender strategy, and from the strategy, instruments the
program to (i) maintain instrumentation-state variables, and
(ii) invoke Capsicum primitives based on the values of the
variables so that the program satisfies its policy.
For a Capsicum architect to update capweave for an
updated version of Capsicum, they only need to update
declarative definitions of (i) the state maintained by Cap-
sicum, (ii) the primitives available to a program, (iii) and
each primitive’s effect on the Capsicum state. In practice,
the state and primitives are easy to define: together they
account for only one tenth of the capweave source code.
We determined experimentally that capweave allows a
programmer to rewrite practical programs to satisfy policies
that rule out known critical exploits of the programs. We
applied capweave to rewrite several UNIX utilities for
Capsicum that have demonstrated security vulnerabilities.
The rewritten programs included programs that were previ-
ously rewritten manually by the Capsicum team, programs
suggested through discussion with the Capsicum develop-
ment team, and the PHP CGI interpreter, whose policy
was defined by independent security researchers at MIT
Lincoln Laboratory. capweave allowed us to rewrite each
utility using only a small handful of program annotations,
no more than 11 lines, and a simple high-level policy of
no more than 115 lines in our policy language. Each policy
not only ruled out specific known exploits, but restricted
the capabilities of significant segments of the program,
potentially ruling out a large class of future vulnerabilities.
Programs rewritten by capweave executed with equivalent
behavior to programs instrumented manually by an expert,
and incurred sufficiently low runtime overhead that they are
still deployable: only 4% runtime overhead over unwoven
programs on realistic workloads. We have provided a Cap-
sicum virtual machine containing all programs and policies
used in our experiments.1
Organization: §II uses the wget downloader to
illustrate the Capsicum policy-weaving problem and
capweave. §III discusses the design of capweave in de-
tail. §IV presents an experimental evaluation of the correct-
ness and performance of capweave and programs rewritten
by applying capweave. §V discusses related work, and §VI
concludes.
1The virtual machine used is available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/
711q31mccz47rt4/capweave-exp-vm.tar.gz.
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void wget(char* uls[], int num_urls) {
// For each URL input by the user:
for (int i = 0; i < num_urls; i++) {
C0: sync_fork();
L0: char* url_nm = urls[i];
// If the URL is an HTTP resource:
L1: if (is_http(url_nm)) {
// Open a socket to the server:
L2: int svr_sock = open_http(url_nm);
char* out_path = url_nm;
bool redir_url = false;
/* If server sends redirect
* with status 3xx: */
if (must_3xx_redirect(svr_sock)) {
redir_url = true;
/* Get the name of the output
* file from the server: */
L3: out_path = get_outnm(svr_sock);
}
L4: char* data = read_http(svr_sock);
C1: redir_url ? cap_enter() : ;
L5: write_data(out_path);
} else { ... }
C2: sync_join();
}
}
Figure 1. Pseudocode of the wget downloader instrumented to invoke
Capsicum primitives. wget takes an array of URL’s as input, and writes
the data at each URL to the file system of its host. Particularly subtle
segments of wget’s code are annotated with comments, and discussed in
§II-A. Capsicum primitives are typeset in bold font.
II. MOTIVATION
In this section, we motivate the Capsicum policy-weaving
problem, and illustrate our solution by describing how
capweave is used to secure the wget downloader.
A. wget: an Insecure Program and a Desired Policy
We now present a simplified version of the wget down-
loader and a desired security policy that past versions of
wget do not satisfy. The wget downloader is a command-
line utility that takes as input a list of URL’s. For each URL,
wget attempts to download the data addressed by the URL
and write the data in the file system of wget’s host. wget is
a mature, sophisticated tool that supports the HTTP, HTTPS,
and FTP protocols, can be run non-interactively, and consists
of 64,443 lines of C source code, including whitespace and
comments [16].
Pseudocode for a simplified version of wget is given
in Fig. 1. Important program points are annotated with C
labels (e.g., L0). (Statements in Fig. 1 in bold font are
invoked by a version of wget instrumented for Capsicum.
Such statements are discussed in §II-B; for now, assume that
wget does not execute such statements.) wget takes as
input an array of URL’s. For each input URL, wget fetches
the data addressed by the URL and writes the data to the file
system of the host system on which wget runs. In particular,
for each URL, wget determines under what protocol the
URL is addressed (Fig. 1, line L1). Once wget determines
the protocol used, it runs protocol-specific functions to (i)
open a socket to the server holding the URL (line L2), (ii)
download the data addressed by the URL over the socket
(lines L3 and L4), and (iii) write the data to a file to the
file system (line L5).
Unfortunately, versions of wget through v.1.12 demon-
strate a vulnerability that allows an attacker who controls a
server with which wget interacts to write data to any file on
the host file system that can be written by the user who runs
wget. The vulnerability is exposed when wget processes
a particular HTTP response from the server. In particular,
wget may receive from a server a redirect response, which
directs wget to download data from a different network
address. When wget receives such a response, it determines
the path on its host file system to which it will write
data directly from the information provided by the redirect
server. A malicious server can exploit this behavior to craft
a redirect response that causes wget to write data chosen
by the attacker to a path in the file system chosen by the
attacker. A server can exploit such a vulnerability to execute
code on the host system by directing wget to write data to
an appropriate startup or configuration file [2].
Ideally, a wget developer would formally specify that
wget must not demonstrate a vulnerability along the lines
of the one described above, and would rewrite wget so that
it satisfies such a specification. However, rewriting wget to
do so requires detailed knowledge of both the structure of
wget and of the HTTP protocol. Thus, it would be useful if
a developer could define an acceptable, if perhaps weaker,
specification for wget in terms of commonly-used, well-
understood operating-system objects, such as file descriptors,
and automatically rewrite wget to satisfy such a policy. In
particular, one useful policy for wget defined in terms of
file descriptors would be:
Policy 1. When wget executes read_http, it should
always be able to open arbitrary files and sockets. But wget
should execute write_data with the ability to open files
if and only if it has not received an HTTP-redirect response.
B. Securing wget on Capsicum
The Capsicum operating system [10] provides a set of
powerful security-oriented system calls (i.e., primitives) that
an application can invoke to ensure that it only demonstrates
secure behavior, even if an attacker triggers a serious vul-
nerability in the application. Capsicum extends the notion
of a file descriptor provided by UNIX to that of a capability
by mapping each file descriptor opened by a process to
a set of access rights that the process holds for the file
descriptor. Each right corresponds roughly to a UNIX system
call that operates over file descriptors (e.g., the access right
CAP_READ corresponds to the read system call). When a
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process running on Capsicum invokes a system call c on
file descriptor f, Capsicum only carries out c if the process
holds the right CAP_C for f. Capsicum also maps each
executing process to an ambient-capability flag, which is
a Boolean value that controls whether the process can open
new file descriptors.
Capsicum’s capabilities were designed so that a program
executing on Capsicum begins by executing a small, trusted
code segment that manages capabilities, and then executes
complex, untrusted code that can interact with its envi-
ronment only through the capabilities set by the trusted
code. When a process opens a file descriptor, it holds all
access rights for the descriptor. Throughout its execution,
a process can invoke a Capsicum primitive limitfd(d,
R) on descriptor d and set of rights R to decrease its rights
for d to only those in R. A process begins executing with
the capabilities of its parent, and can invoke the Capsicum
primitive cap enter to relinquish the ambient authority.
A programmer can instrument wget to invoke the Cap-
sicum primitives so that it satisfies the informal security
policy introduced in §II-A. The instrumented version of the
example wget is the code shown in Fig. 1, including the
Capsicum primitives shown in bold font. Essentially, wget
is instrumented so that if it handles an HTTP redirection,
then it invokes cap enter before attempting to write data
to its host’s file system (line L3).
However, for a programmer to instrument his program to
invoke Capsicum primitives correctly, he must address two
challenges, illustrated by the instrumented version of wget.
First, once a programmer formulates a policy, he must
modify his to invoke the Capsicum primitives to enforce the
policy. However, the Capsicum primitives can have subtle
consequences. In the example wget, once the program-
mer determines that under some conditions, wget should
execute program point L3 without ambient authority, then
the programmer can immediately deduce that wget must
sometimes invoke the cap enter primitive before executing
L3. However, once the programmer also determines that
if wget does not receive a redirect response, then wget
should execute L3 with ambient authority, it is fairly difficult
for him to decide how to instrument wget. The difficulty
stems from the fact that once a process invokes cap enter,
then the process can never obtain the ambient authority for
the rest of its execution. Thus, if a wget process attempts
to download from URL u, receives a redirection response,
and then invokes cap enter, then the process must execute
without ambient authority when downloading from all input
URL’s following u.
wget can be instrumented to satisfy the full informal
policy of Policy 1 by compartmentalizing it to use multi-
ple communicating processes, as follows. A “main” wget
process executes the loop that iterates over the list of input
URL’s. To download data from each input URL, the main
process synchronously forks a worker process to download
let redir_exploit =
any_instr* . [ L0 ] . any_instr*
. [ L3 ] . [not L0]*
. [ L5 with AMB ] in
let noredir_fails =
any_instr* . [ L0 ]
. [ not { L0, L3 } ]*
. [ L5 with (no AMB) ] in
let http_fails =
any_instr* . [ L4 with (no AMB) ] in
redir_exploit | noredir_fails | http_fails
Figure 2. A capweave policy for the example wget given in Fig. 1.
The policy is a regular expression that matches all executions of wget that
constitute undesired executions of wget, and is described in §II-C.
the data and write it to the file system (line C0). Each
worker process begins executing with ambient authority.
If the worker receives an HTTP-redirect response while
downloading from its URL, then it invokes cap enter,
but when the worker process terminates (line C1), the main
wget process continues to execute with ambient authority,
with which it forks the next worker process. (Capsicum
only requires that a child process begin executing with the
capabilities of its parent, but places no restrictions on the
capabilities of the parent based on the capabilities of its
children.)
Second, the instrumented program sometimes must update
and consult additional instrumentation state to determine
when to invoke Capsicum primitives. In Fig. 1, the instru-
mented wget maintains a Boolean variable redir_url
that reflects whether or not wget received a redirection
response when downloading from the current URL. The
instrumented wget invokes cap enter (line C1) if and
only if redir_url is true.
Thus, an application can be rewritten to satisfy strong
security requirements while preserving the functionality of
the original program by correctly manipulating capabilities
across multiple communicating processes and maintaining
additional instrumentation state. However, it is non-trivial
to determine how to rewrite an application to do so. In
particular, the control locations at which an application must
invoke primitives to satisfy a policy might not be near each
other in the application’s code. For example, in Fig. 1, wget
invokes fork and cap enter at distant program points.
C. Securing wget on Capsicum with capweave
§II-A and §II-B illustrate the general challenges that a pro-
grammer faces in rewriting a program to execute correctly
on Capsicum. While a programmer can typically define the
desired behavior of his rewritten program purely in terms
of capabilities (e.g., Policy 1), Capsicum does not allow
the programmer to state such a policy explicitly. Instead,
the programmer must instrument his program manually
to invoke primitives that manipulate both capabilities and
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processes so that the resulting program executes with the
desired capabilities. To help a programmer address this
challenge, we have developed a Capsicum policy weaver,
called capweave. capweave takes as input from the
programmer (1) a program that invokes no Capsicum prim-
itives (for the example wget, the code in Fig. 1 without
the instrumentation statements), and (2) a policy describing
correct executions of the program purely in terms of the
capabilities that the instrumented program should have as it
executes. For wget, a formalization of Policy 1 is given in
Fig. 2, which is discussed below.
A policy that capweave takes as input is a regular
language of capability traces that each constitute a policy
violation, where a capability trace is a sequence of program
points paired with the capabilities that the program has when
it executes the program point. A policy regular expression
that represents the Policy 1 is given in Fig. 2. The language
of violations in Fig. 2 is defined as the union of three
sublanguages: redir_exploit, noredir_fails, and
http_fails. redir_exploit formally expresses the
set of all wget executions in which an attacker exploits
wget’s vulnerability in processing HTTP redirection re-
sponses. redir_exploit is defined as any sequence of
instructions, followed by the program point at which the
next URL in the array of inputs is selected (L0), followed
by any sequence of instructions, followed by the program
point at which wget processes an HTTP redirect response
(L3), followed by any sequence of instructions before the
selection of the next input URL (not L0), followed by
wget writing downloaded data to the file system (L5) with
ambient authority.
noredir_fails formally expresses the set of all
wget executions in which wget does not receive an
HTTP redirection response, but attempts to write down-
loaded data to the file system with insufficient capability.
noredir_fails is defined as any sequence of instruc-
tions, followed by L0, followed by any sequence of instruc-
tions other than L0 or L3, followed by executing L5 with
ambient authority.
http_fails formally expresses the set of all wget ex-
ecutions in which wget attempts to finish an HTTP session
without ambient capability. http_fails is defined as any
sequence of instructions followed by attempting to complete
the HTTP protocol (L4) without ambient capability.
For the simplified version of wget given in Fig. 1, the
accompanying capweave policy given in Fig. 2 is almost
as large as the program itself. However, in practice, policies
for real-world programs tend to grow very slowly in the
size of the program. For example, the real wget program
contains 64,443 lines of source code, but its entire policy
can be expressed in only 35 lines of our policy language.
capweave outputs a version of the input program in-
strumented to invoke Capsicum primitives so that it satisfies
the input policy. From the uninstrumented version of the
example wget (i.e., Fig. 1 without the instrumentation state-
ments) and the example policy given in Fig. 2, capweave
outputs the correctly instrumented version of wget (Fig. 1
with the instrumentation statements).
D. capweave Parametrized on the Capsicum Semantics
The implemented version of capweave is actually struc-
tured slightly differently than described above: the im-
plemented tool supports a more general model in which
capweave is generated from an explicit description of the
semantics of Capsicum [15]. The advantage of this approach
is that it provides an easy way to adapt capweave either
when Capsicum is extended or when the “packaging” of
sequences of invocations of Capsicum primitives as a library
API is changed.
The Capsicum semantics defines (i) the state maintained
by Capsicum as a program executes, (ii) the set of primitives
that an instrumented program can invoke, and (iii) the effects
of each primitive on the Capsicum state. For instance, the
state maintained by Capsicum is a stack of process states,
where a process state is (a) a map from each descriptor
to its current set of access rights, and (b) a Boolean value
indicating whether the process has ambient authority. If a
process state p0 is below a process state p1 on the stack,
then the process whose state is p0 spawned the process
whose state is p1 via a synchronous fork. The semantics
also defines the effect of each primitive on the Capsicum
state. For instance, cap enter sets the Boolean value to
False in the process state of the currently executing process
(i.e., the top process on the stack); fork pushes a copy of the
top process state onto the stack; join pops the top process
state from the stack; etc.
It is significantly easier for a Capsicum architect to define
a model of Capsicum using this mechanism than it would
be for him to implement the entire policy weaver. The
entire capweave implementation consists of 35k lines of
OCaml that employs many subtle optimizations, whereas
the Capsicum model is specified in only 3k lines, which
essentially define a Capsicum interpreter. (The Capsicum
state and interpretation functions are discussed in more detail
in §III-A3.)
In general, the Capsicum semantics would be speci-
fied by a Capsicum architect, rather than an application
implementer, and would be changed rarely—either when
new Capsicum primitives are introduced or when there are
changes in the API of a library that packages Capsicum calls
into routines that are more convenient to use than “raw”
Capsicum. Application programmers can then regenerate an
updated capweave tool and weave policies into as many
applications as they wish.
III. DESIGN OF THE POLICY WEAVER
In this section, we formally define the Capsicum policy-
weaving problem, and describe our algorithm to solve it.
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prog := (block0, {block1, . . . , blockn})
block := LABEL : stmt; termin
stmt := v0 := op(v1, . . . , vn) vi ∈Vars
| dscinst
| wvinstrs
termin := halt | br v ? LABELt : LABELf v ∈Vars
dscinst := os : v0 := open(v1),
v0, v1 ∈ Vars, os ∈ Opens
Figure 3. Syntax of the IMP〈wvinstrs〉 language: an imperative language
parametrized on a set of woven instructions wvinstrs.
capinstr := v0 := op(v1, . . . , vn) vi ∈WVars
| v ? capprim v ∈WVars
capprim := cap enter
| limitfd(os, rs) os ∈ Opens, rs ⊆Rights
| fork
| join
Figure 4. Syntax of the set of Capsicum woven instructions capinstr.
We also describe how components of the problem, such as
unwoven and woven programs and Capsicum, are modeled
in practice.
A. The Policy-Weaving Problem
1) Language Syntax: The syntax of languages of both un-
woven and woven programs will be defined as instances of a
language of simple imperative programs, IMP. IMP is a small
“core” language that supports only updates to program state
with the result of language operations, operations on de-
scriptors, invocations of woven instructions, and conditional
branches of control-flow. However, the implementation of
our weaving algorithm instruments programs in the LLVM
intermediate language [17], and thus can weave programs
compiled from widely-used, practical languages, such as C
and C++.
Syntax of Unwoven Programs: The syntax of language
IMP〈wvinstrs〉 (Fig. 3) is defined for a fixed set of program
variables Vars, a fixed set of control labels Labels, and a
set of open sites Opens that label program instructions at
which descriptors are opened. The syntax is parametrized
on a set of woven instructions wvinstrs. An IMP program
prog is a set of instruction blocks, including an initial
instruction block block0. Each instruction block is a unique
label, a statement, and a block-terminator instruction. A
statement stores the result of a language operation, opens
a descriptor, or executes a weaving instruction. A block
terminator halts the program or branches. The language of
unwoven programs UNWOVEN is the language of imperative
programs with no woven instructions: UNWOVEN = IMP〈∅〉.
Syntax of Woven Programs: The language of woven
programs is the language of IMP programs that may execute
Capsicum woven instructions (Fig. 4), defined over a set of
weaving variables WVars. A Capsicum woven instruction
may store the result of a language operation in a variable in
WVars, or may execute a guarded invocation of a Capsicum
primitive. A Capsicum primitive is either cap enter, fork,
join, or limitfd(os, rs), for os ∈ Opens and rs ⊆ Rights.
A woven program is an IMP program instrumented to
execute Capsicum instructions: WOVEN = IMP〈capinstr〉.
2) Language Semantics: In this section, we define a
semantics of WOVEN programs by mapping each WOVEN
program to the executions that it may perform. In particular,
we define a semantic function τ that maps every WOVEN
program P and initial program state p to the trace of
capabilities that P holds throughout its execution from p.
τ is defined using an operational-semantic function σs that
describes how each program statement updates the state
of the program. σs is defined in terms of the operational
semantic functions σw and σc, which define how each
weaving instruction updates the program state. σw and σc are
defined in terms of the Capsicum interpretation of Capsicum
primitives, which defines how each primitive updates the
state maintained by Capsicum (§III-A3).
The semantics of WOVEN, given in Fig. 5, is defined
by a function τ (Fig. 5, Eqns. (1) and (2)) that maps
each program in WOVEN and initial program state p to
the sequence of capabilities that the program holds during
an execution that starts from p. Let a program state be an
assignment from each program variable to an integer value:
progstates = Vars→ Z, where Z denotes the set of integers.
A capability state is the state maintained by the Capsicum
operating system. The set of capability states capstates
is defined by the Capsicum architect (see §III-A3). Let a
capability trace be a sequence of program labels paired with
the capabilities that the program has as it executes the block
with the given label: captraces = (Labels × capstates)∗.
τ maps each program P ∈ WOVEN and program state
p ∈ progstates to the capability trace that P generates in
an execution that starts from p (Fig. 5, Eqn. (1)). The trace
generated by P from a program state p is the trace that the
initial block of P generates in an execution that starts from
p, along with a fixed initial woven state and capability state
(Fig. 5, Eqn. (2)).
The semantic function τb, given in Fig. 5, Eqns. (3)
and (4), defines the capability trace that a block generates
in an execution from a given state. Let a woven state be
a map from each weaving variable to an integer value:
wvstates = WVars → Z. Let a full state be a program-
state, woven-state, and capability-state triple: fullstates =
progstates × wvstates × capstates. Then τb defines the
capability trace generated by executing a given block from
a given full-state (Fig. 5, Eqn. (3)). The trace generated by
executing a block LABEL : s; t from a full state f is LABEL
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τ : WOVEN → progstates→ captraces (1)
τJ(block0, {block1, . . . , blockn})K(p) = τbJP, block0K(p, ∅, ci) (2)
τb : (WOVEN × block)→ fullstates→ captraces (3)
τbJP, LABEL : stmt; termin)K(p, i, c) = (LABEL, c) :: τtJP, terminK(σsJstmtK(p, i, c)) (4)
τt : (WOVEN × termin)→ fullstates→ captraces (5)
τtJP, haltK(p, i, c) =  (6)
τtJP, br v ? LABELt : LABELf K(p, i, c) = let dest = if p(v) 6= 0 then LABELt else LABELf in
τbJlabelblkP (dest)K(p, i, c) (7)
σs : stmt→ fullstates→ fullstates (8)
σsJv0 := op(v1, . . . , vn)K(p, i, c) = (ιoJv0 := op(v1, . . . , vn)K(p), i, c) (9)
σsJdscinstK(p, i, c) = let (p′, c′) = ιdJdscinstK(p, c) in (p′, i, c′) (10)
σsJcapinstrK(p, i, c) = σcJcapinstrK(i, c) (11)
σc : capinstr→ (wvstates× capstates)→ (wvstates× capstates) (12)
σcJv0 := op(v1, . . . , vn)K(i, c) = (ιoJv0 := op(v1, . . . , vn)K(i), c) (13)
σcJv ? capprimK(i, c) = (i, if i(v) 6= 0 then ιpJcapprimK(c) else c) (14)
Figure 5. Semantics of WOVEN. τ , τb, and τt define the capability trace that a WOVEN program generates by executing a given program, block, or
terminator instruction, respectively, from a given state. In the definition of τt, labelblkP maps each label to the instruction block that it labels. σs and
σc define how a program statement and woven instruction, respectively, update the state of a program. ιo and ιp denote the interpretation of program
operations and Capsicum primitives (Fig. 6), respectively). progstates, wvstates, capstates, and fullstates denote the spaces of program states, woven
states, capability states, and “full” program states, respectively (see §III-A2).
paired with the capability state in f , followed by the trace
generated by executing the terminator instruction t starting
in the full-state obtained by updating f with the statement
s (Fig. 5, Eqn. (4)).
The terminator semantic function τt, given in Fig. 5,
Eqns. (5)–(7), defines the trace generated by executing a
block terminator from a given full-state f ∈ fullstates. The
terminator halt generates the empty trace (Fig. 5, Eqn. (6)).
The terminator br v ? LABELt : LABELf generates the trace
of executing either the block labeled LABELt or the block
labeled LABELf from full-state f , depending on whether v’s
value is non-zero or zero, respectively (Fig. 5, Eqn. (7)).
The statement semantic function σs, given in Fig. 5,
Eqns. (8)–(11), defines how a statement s ∈ stmt updates
a full-state f ∈ fullstates. If s is a language operation,
then it updates the program state in f according to the
language semantics of the operation (Fig. 5, Eqn. (9)). In
Eqn. (9), the language semantics is denoted by the function
ιo : stmt → progstates → progstates, and omitted for
brevity. If s is a descriptor instruction, then it updates the
program and capability state in f according to the Capsicum
interpretation of descriptor instructions ιd (Fig. 5, Eqn. (10);
for a discussion of ιd, see §III-A3). If s is a weaving
instruction, then it updates the weaving and capability state
in f as defined by the weaving-instruction semantic function
σw (Fig. 5, Eqn. (11)).
The woven-instruction semantic function σw, given in
Fig. 5, Eqns. (12)–(14), defines how a woven instruction
v ∈ wvinstrs updates a woven state w ∈ wvstates and a
capability state c ∈ capstates. If v stores the value of a
language operation in a woven-state variable, then the woven
state is updated according to the language semantics (Fig. 5,
Eqn. (13)). If the woven instruction is a guarded Capsicum
primitive v ? p, then if v is zero in w, v ? p does not update
the woven state, and otherwise, v ? p updates c according to
the Capsicum interpretation of primitive p (Fig. 5, Eqn. (14);
for a discussion of the interpretation of primitives ιp, see
§III-A3).
3) Capsicum Interpretation Functions: The semantics of
WOVEN (§III-A2) is defined from (1) the space of capability
states maintained by Capsicum, (2) the initial capability
state with which a program executes, and (3) the Capsicum
interpretations, which define how program instructions and
Capsicum primitives update capability state. If the semantics
of Capsicum were to be extended or revised in some way,
these are the only pieces of information that a Capsicum
architect would have to modify to obtain an updated version
of capweave.
A capability state defines what capabilities are held by
a program (Fig. 6, Eqns. (15) and (16)). Let a process
capability state be a Boolean flag, denoting whether a
process is in capability mode, together with a map from
each descriptor to a set of rights (Fig. 6, Eqn. (15)). Then a
capability state is a stack of process capability states (Fig. 6,
Eqn. (16)).
The initial capability state ci is a singleton stack contain-
ing a process state denoting that the process has ambient
capability, and that the rights of no descriptors are defined:
ci = [(True, ∅)].
The Capsicum interpretation functions are given in Fig. 6.
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proccap = B× (Opens→ P(Rights)) (15)
capstates = proccap∗ (16)
ιd : dscinst→ (progstates× capstates)→ (progstates× capstates) (17)
ιdJd : x := open(y)K(p, r :: rs) = let (fd,R′) = if ambcap(r) then (fresh(r),Rights) else (−1,⊥) in
(p[x 7→ fd], (ambcap(r), rights(r)[d 7→ R′]) :: rs) (18)
ιp : capprim→ capstates→ capstates (19)
ιpJcap enterK(r :: rs) = (False, rights(r)) :: rs (20)
ιpJlimitfd(d,R)K(r :: rs) = (ambcap(r), rs(r)[d 7→ rs(r)(d) ∩R]) :: rs (21)
ιpJforkK(r :: rs) = r :: r :: rs (22)
ιpJjoinK(r :: r′ :: rs) = (ambcap(r′), descrights(r)) :: rs (23)
Figure 6. Definition of the space of capability states and interpretation functions. proccap denotes the space of process states. In Eqn. (16), P(Rights)
denotes the power set of Capsicum access rights. capstates denotes the space of capability states. ιd and ιp denote the interpretations of descriptor
instructions and Capsicum primitives, respectively. In Eqns. (18), (21), and (23), ambcap(r) and rs(r) denote the ambient-authority flag and map from
descriptors to access rights, respectively, in process state r. In Eqn. (18), fresh(r) denotes a new descriptor value that is not bound in process state r.
The first interpretation function ιd defines how each descrip-
tor instruction i ≡ d: x := open(y) (Fig. 6, Eqns. (17)
and (18)) updates a program state p ∈ progstates and
capability state c ∈ capstates (Fig. 6, Eqn. (17)). If the
program holds ambient authority in c, then i updates p so
that x holds a fresh descriptor, and updates c so that the fresh
descriptor has all access rights. Otherwise, i updates p so that
x holds the value −1, and the latest descriptor opened at d
is not mapped to any set of access rights (Fig. 6, Eqn. (18)).
The second interpretation function ιp (Fig. 6, Eqns. (19)
and (20)) specifies how a Capsicum primitive p ∈ Capprims
updates a capability state c ∈ capstates (Fig. 6, Eqn. (19)).
If a program executes the Capsicum primitive cap enter,
then the program relinquishes ambient authority (Fig. 6,
Eqn. (20)). If a program invokes the Capsicum primitive
limitfd(d, R), then the program’s rights for the last descrip-
tor opened at d are updated to the intersection of the pro-
gram’s rights in c and the set of rights R (Fig. 6, Eqn. (21)).
If a program invokes the Capsicum primitive fork, then the
program pushes a copy of the current process-capability state
onto the stack of process capability states (Fig. 6, Eqn. (22)).
If a program invokes the Capsicum primitive join, then the
program pops its top process capability state pc, and updates
the new top process state in its capability state to have the
descriptor rights in pc (Fig. 6, Eqn. (23)).
Policy Semantics of WOVEN: A policy is a set of exe-
cutions of a program annotated with the capabilities that the
program must have as it executes. Although the capability
state of a program completely defines the capabilities held
by a program as it executes, writing policies defined by the
complete capability-state may be complicated or infeasible.
In particular, the Capsicum interpretation functions in Fig. 6
are defined over capability states that are stacks of process
capability states, but practical policies typically are defined
over only the currently executing process (i.e., the top
process on the stack of process capability states).
To bridge the gap between the capability state maintained
by Capsicum and the state used to define policies, the
Capsicum architect defines a space of policy states polstates
and a policy state abstraction α : capstates→ polstates that
maps each capability state to the policy state that represents
it. Our implementation of capweave allows policies to
be defined using the capabilities of the currently executing
process: polstates = proccap, and α(cur :: procs) = cur.
A policy state abstraction α defines a policy semantics
function that maps each woven program and initial program
state to the trace of program labels paired with policy states
that the program generates in an execution from the initial
program state. For poltraces = (Labels × polstates)∗, the
policy semantics function τα : WOVEN → (progstates →
poltraces) is
ταJprogK(p) = mα(τJprogK(p))
where
mα() = 
mα((LABEL, c) :: t) = (LABEL, α(c)) :: mα(t)
4) Problem Definition: The policy-weaving problem is
to take an unwoven program and a policy, and construct a
weaving of the unwoven program that satisfies the policy.
We formally define the weaving problem using the policy
semantics of a program and the definition of a weaving. To
simplify the definition of the policy-weaving problem, we
fix the definition of the Capsicum interpretation functions,
initial state, and policy-state abstraction to be as defined in
Fig. 6 and §III-A2. The definition of the program and policy
semantics of WOVEN programs is thus fixed as well.
For an unwoven program P ∈ UNWOVEN and a woven
program P ′ ∈ WOVEN, P ′ is a weaving of P if P ′ is
constructed by only adding woven instructions to P .
Defn. 1. For IMP statements s and s′, s′ is a weaving of s
if one of the following holds
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• s is not a sequence of statements, and (1) s′ = s or (2)
s′ = s′0; s
′
1 and either s
′
0 is a weaving of s and s
′
1 is a
sequence of woven instructions, or s′0 is a sequence of
woven instructions and s′1 is a weaving of s.
• s is a sequence of statements s0; s1 and s′ is a sequence
of statements s′0; s
′
1 where s
′
0 is a weaving of s0 and
s′1 is a weaving of s1.
A program P ′ = (block′0, {block1, . . . , block′n}) is a weav-
ing of a program P = (block0, {block1, . . . , blockn}) if
for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n, blocki = LABELi : si; ti and
block′i = LABELi : s
′
i; ti, where s
′
i is a weaving of si.
The policy-weaving problem is to take an unwoven pro-
gram and a policy defining the allowed executions of the
program, and instrument the program so that it satisfies the
policy.
Defn. 2. Let P ∈ UNWOVEN be an unwoven program, and
let Q ⊆ captraces be a regular language of capability traces.
For a woven program P ′, let the traces of P ′, denoted as
T (P ′) ⊆ captraces, be the set of capability traces generated
by some input to the program: T (P ′) = {ταJP ′K(i) | i ∈
(Vars → Z)}. A solution to the policy-weaving problem
WEAVE(P,Q) is a woven program P ′ ∈ WOVEN such that
P ′ is a weaving of P (Defn. 1) and T (P ′) ⊆ Q.
WEAVE is undecidable in general; it can be shown that
any algorithm that could solve WEAVE could decide if a
program in a Turing-complete language satisfies an arbitrary
safety property. capweave uses a sound but incomplete
solver for WEAVE, described in §III-B.
B. Solving Policy Weaving with Automata Games
We have developed a sound but incomplete solver for
WEAVE, called capweave, that reduces WEAVE to finding
a winning strategy to a two-player safety game, played by
an Attacker and a Defender. capweave uses an existing
automata-theoretic weaver-generator algorithm [15] as its
core engine. To make the paper self-contained, this section
summarizes that algorithm, and describes how capweave
applies the weaver generator to weave practical programs
for Capsicum.
The weaver generator solves a version of the policy-
weaving problem in which an input program, a policy, and
the operating system are all modeled as automata. The
weaver generator solves such a problem by reducing it to
finding a modular winning strategy to a two-player safety
game. Intuitively, a two-player safety game is an automaton
in which the set of states is partitioned into a set of Attacker
states and a set of Defender states. When the game is in
an Attacker state, the Attacker can transition the state to
any adjacent state, and analogously for the Defender. The
goal of the Attacker is to eventually transition the game
to an accepting state of the automaton, and the goal of
the Defender is to prevent the Attacker from doing so. A
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Figure 7. Architecture of capweave. Items in the box labeled “Capsicum
Arch.” are defined by the Capsicum architect. “Init. state” denotes the initial
Capsicum state, “Desc. interp.” denotes the interpretation of Capsicum
program statements, “Prim. interp” denotes the interpretation of Capsicum
primitives, and “Policy abs.” denotes the policy abstraction.
winning Attacker (Defender) strategy is a function that reads
the transitions chosen by both the Attacker and Defender and
outputs a transition for the Attacker (Defender) such that if
the Attacker (Defender) always chooses the transition output
by the strategy, then the Attacker (Defender) always wins
the game. For a game defined by a pushdown automaton,
a modular Attacker (Defender) strategy is a strategy that
outputs transitions independent of the transitions chosen
before the most recent unmatched push transition.
If a game defined by a restricted classes of pushdown
automata called Visibly Pushdown Automata (VPA) [18], has
a winning modular Attacker or Defender strategy, then the
strategy can be found efficiently [14].
Our policy weaver capweave soundly reduces a policy-
weaving problem WEAVE(P,Q) to the problem of finding a
winning Defender strategy to a game defined by a VPA.
Intuitively, capweave constructs a game in which the
choices of an Attacker correspond to instructions that a
program can execute, the choices of a Defender correspond
to Capsicum primitives that can be invoked, and accepting
states are reached when the program violates a policy. A
winning Defender strategy for the game thus corresponds
to a weaving that ensures that the woven program never
violates the policy. The problem of finding a winning
Defender strategy is NP-complete in general, but in practice
capweave finds a winning strategy to a game efficiently by
applying heuristics introduced in previous work( [15], Sec.
4).
Fig. 7 illustrates how capweave applies the weaver
generator. The weaver generator takes as input a program
and policy represented as VPA’s, and an operating system
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(e.g., Capsicum) modeled as a visibly-pushdown transducer.
Thus, to apply the weaver generator, capweave must
soundly model its input program, policy, and Capsicum as
VPA’s. capweave models the program as a VPA con-
structed directly from the program’s interprocedural control-
flow graph, which is a standard technique in program
analysis [18]. However, in principle, the program can be
modeled by any VPA that overapproximates the possible
executions of the program (e.g., models constructed via
predicate abstraction [19]). Each policy that capweave
takes as input is a regular language, so the policy can be
represented as a finite-state automaton, and thus as a visibly-
pushdown automaton [18]. capweave constructs the trans-
ducer model of Capsicum from the space of capability
states and Capsicum interpretations (§III-A3). Details of this
construction are given in App. VII-A.
The weaver generator produces an instrumentation strat-
egy represented as a transducer that reads a sequence of pro-
gram instructions and outputs the next Capsicum primitive
that a woven program should execute. capweave compiles
such an instrumentation transducer to a woven program by
representing the transition function of the instrumentation
transducer using a state variable and the woven instructions
in capinstr (§III-A1). capweave weaves its input program
to consult its state variable to determine which Capsicum
primitive to invoke next as the program executes, and
then update the state variable. This compilation scheme is
described further in App. VII-B.
If a programmer provides a program P and policy Q for
which capweave cannot find a solution to WEAVE(P,Q),
then capweave can, in principle, provide useful diagnostic
information to the programmer. There are multiple reasons
why capweave may not be able to find a solution to a
weaving problem WEAVE(P,Q): (1) WEAVE(P,Q) may not
have a solution. (2) WEAVE(P,Q) may have a solution, but
capweave may not find a solution because either (a) when
capweave constructs a VPA model of P , the resulting
model allows P to perform more executions than P can
actually perform, or (b) the solution does not correspond
to a modular winning Defender strategy [15]. In all cases
except (b), the weaver generator produces a winning Attacker
strategy that describes the executions that P can perform
to violate Q, no matter what Capsicum primitives are
invoked by any weaving. From such an Attacker strategy
and the Capsicum semantics, capweave could construct
an unweavable policy Q′ that is no more restrictive than Q
(i.e., Q′ ⊇ Q). capweave could then either validate that
Q′ is truly unsatisfiable and provide Q′ to the user as an
explanation of capweave’s failure, or use Q′ to refine its
model of the input program. In case (b), capweave could
still apply various heuristics to iteratively weaken the input
policy, check if the weakened policy has a weaving, and
provide this information as diagnostics to the programmer.
We have not implemented support for handling failures in
capweave, and do not evaluate capweave’s practicality
in handling such failures. We leave such an evaluation for
future work.
C. Weaving Practical Programs
In §III-A4, we defined the policy-weaving problem for a
simple imperative language. However, the weaving problem
and our policy weaver can be extended to handle programs
written in practical programming languages, such as C, in
which programs may have multiple recursive procedures,
or manipulate compound datatypes. In particular, our actual
policy weaver has been implemented to weave programs
represented in the LLVM intermediate language [17].
A key strength of Capsicum is that a program that runs
on Capsicum may run code injected by an attacker (e.g.,
via a stack-smashing attack [20]), and yet can still satisfy
a non-trivial security policy. Thus, in practice it is critical
that our policy weaver be able to correctly weave programs
that can run injected code. We could implement such a
weaver by extending the language semantics and policy-
weaving problem described in §III-A2 and §III-A4 in a
straightforward way. The only change we would need to
make is that the policy weaver would not be able to choose
what Capsicum primitives the woven program will execute
after it executes specified program points at which the
program might run injected code.
A programmer who uses capweave must understand his
program sufficiently well to define a correct policy in terms
of program actions paired with capabilities. Furthermore, in
practice, the size of a policy may not differ significantly
from the size of the code required to instrument the policy.
However, the key utility of capweave is that it allows
the programmer to reason purely in terms of capabilities
that the program must hold over its execution. Because
a programmer’s ultimate goal is to write a program that
holds desired capabilities, this reasoning is strictly easier
than determining desired capabilities and then rewriting the
program to use the intricate Capsicum primitives to induce
the capabilities.
More sophisticated programming tools could further ease
the burden of using capweave by, e.g., inferring a likely
policy from the callsites of system calls that manipulate
descriptors. Such a tool need only determine the capabilities
that the program requires as it executes, and discharge to
capweave the problem of instrumenting the program to
hold the required capabilities. To evaluate fully the utility of
capweave and related tools would require a comprehensive
programmer study. We leave this as future work.
IV. PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE AND EXPERIMENTS
We carried out a set of experiments to evaluate the prac-
tical utility of capweave. The experiments were designed
to answer the following questions:
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1) Does capweave allow a programmer to rewrite a
program with less effort and with higher assurance
than if he manually rewrote the program to invoke
Capsicum’s primitives?
2) Does capweave rewrite real-world programs to en-
force practical policies efficiently?
3) Do programs produced by capweave behave compa-
rably, both in terms of correctness and performance,
to programs manually modified by an expert to satisfy
the same policy?
To answer these questions, we applied capweave to a set
of UNIX utilities—all of which had previously demonstrated
security vulnerabilities—so that the instrumented program
satisfied a policy that thwarted the vulnerabilities. The
programs and policies were derived from either previous
work done in developing Capsicum [10], discussions with
Capsicum system and application developers on the Cap-
sicum mailing list [13], or collaborative work with security
researchers at MIT Lincoln Laboratory (MITLL).
The capweave implementation is 35k lines of OCaml,
and uses the LLVM OCaml API, which corresponds closely
to the LLVM API provided for C and C++. capweave takes
as input programs in the LLVM intermediate representation
(called bitcode), and outputs instrumented programs as bit-
code as well. As a result, it can be inserted into any compiler
toolchain that compiles a source program to LLVM bitcode
in some intermediate phase.
capweave generates instrumentation code as a multi-
dimensional array that defines what Capsicum primitive
should be called as each program point is executed. While
the generated code likely cannot be understood easily by a
programmer, the instrumentation transducer (§III-B) can be
recovered from the generated array. The transducer could
perhaps be used by a programmer to more easily understand
the instrumentation, or could be reused to generate code
directly for a different version of the program.
The results of our experiments demonstrate that
capweave is useful for rewriting programs for Capsicum.
In particular:
1) For each of our subject programs, a programmer could
apply capweave by annotating their program with
only 4–11 lines of code, and writing a policy, ex-
pressed purely in terms of Capsicum capabilities, that
could be represented with 35–114 lines of our policy
language. Thus, capweave can be applied to rewrite
programs to satisfy explicit, declarative policies with
minimal effort.
2) capweave wove all programs in less than five min-
utes, except for the PHP CGI interpreter, which it
wove in 46 minutes. Thus, capweave is efficient
enough to be applied to programs in, say, a nightly
build system, and in many cases could reasonably be
integrated into a compiler toolchain used in an edit-
compile-run cycle.
3) Programs rewritten by capweave to satisfy a given
policy match programs manually written by an ex-
pert to satisfy the same policy, and run with over-
head within 4% of unwoven programs on practical
workloads. Thus, in practice, capweave produces
programs that behave comparably to those written by
an expert programmer.
A. Methodology
To answer the experimental questions presented in §IV,
we applied capweave to weave a set of UNIX utilities as
security and performance benchmarks. In this section, we
describe each of the benchmarks applied, and then describe
the experiments that we performed on each benchmark.
1) Benchmark Programs and Policies: We now describe
each of the benchmark programs and policies used, including
its role as a security-critical application, and the source of
its policy. While each policy used was inspired by a known
vulnerability in the benchmark, each policy restricts the
capabilities of large portions of its program’s execution. For
example, the policies for bzip2 and gzip strongly limit
the capabilities of both programs for as long as they execute
their compression and decompression functions. Each policy
thus potentially mitigates a large class of vulnerabilities that
may be unknown when the policy is written. The policy also
explicitly describes the limitations of any program rewritten
to satisfy the policy, and thus the limits of any attacker who
compromises the rewritten program.
bzip2 and gzip: The compression programs bzip2
and gzip can be used by a trusted user to compress data
from an untrusted source. On BSD systems, they are often
used by root to decompress ports of applications. The
compression and decompression functions of bzip2 and
gzip are heavily optimized and quite complex, and have
demonstrated security vulnerabilities in the past [3], [4]. An
attacker who can control the inputs to bzip2 and gzip can
craft an input that allows him to execute arbitrary code with
the privileges of the user who invoked bzip2 or gzip.
We defined a capweave policy that strictly limits the
abilities of an attacker who compromises bzip2 or gzip.
The policy restricts bzip2 and gzip to execute with
only the capability to read from the source file that holds
uncompressed data and write to the file opened to store the
compressed output. An attacker who compromises a version
of bzip2 or gzip that satisfies such a policy can compro-
mise the integrity of the output files of bzip2 or gzip,
but cannot carry out other malicious actions. For instance,
the attacker cannot overwrite arbitrary files. Our capweave
policies for bzip2 and gzip were inspired by previous
work on manually writing programs for Capsicum [10], [21].
php-cgi: Executing programs written in web script-
ing languages, such as PHP, raises multiple security issues.
First, it is inherently difficult to analyze, monitor, and restrict
the behavior of a program written in a scripting language.
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Second, a maliciously-crafted web program can potentially
compromise the interpreter that executes it, and then perform
any action on its host system that is allowed for the user who
launched the interpreter [5].
Using capweave’s policy language, we defined a policy
for the PHP CGI interpreter php-cgi that allows the
interpreter to only read from and write to files defined by a
small set of simple, easily-audited checking functions. Our
policy strictly limits the file I/O of php-cgi itself, and
thus indirectly limits the I/O of any PHP script that the
interpreter executes. We defined the policy by collaborating
with a group of researchers from MITLL.
tar: The tar archiving utility archives sets of files
into a single file. Unfortunately, past versions of tar have
demonstrated vulnerabilities that allow an attacker who
controls the inputs to tar to run injected code with the
privileges of the user who invoked tar [6], [7].
We defined a capweave policy that strictly limits the
abilities of an attacker who compromises tar. The policy
restricts tar to execute vulnerable functions without am-
bient authority. An attacker who compromises a version of
tar that satisfies such a policy can compromise the integrity
of output files opened by tar, but cannot carry out other
malicious actions.
tcpdump: tcpdump is a widely-used network-facing
application that historically has been the target of many
exploits. tcpdump takes as input a Berkeley Packet Filter
(BPF), and a device from which to read packets. In a correct
execution, it reads packets from the device, matches them
against the input BPF, and if the packet matches, prints
the packet to standard output. Unfortunately, the packet-
matching code in tcpdump is complex; in previous versions
of tcpdump, an attacker who controls the network input to
tcpdump can craft a packet that allows him to take control
of the process executing tcpdump [1].
We defined a policy for tcpdump in the capweave
policy language that strictly limits the power of an attacker
who is able to compromise tcpdump. In previous work
on Capsicum [10], the Capsicum developers instrumented
tcpdump so that it could only read from its input network
device and write to standard output. The Capsicum devel-
opers later found through testing that this instrumentation
did not allow tcpdump to resolve network addresses in a
packet, and the developers reinstrumented tcpdump so that
only a small, trusted DNS resolver could open files. The
capweave policy for tcpdump describes the policy that our
revised instrumentation satisfies.
wget: The wget downloader, its vulnerabilities, and
its capweave policy were discussed in §II. Our policy
for wget was inspired by discussion on the Capsicum-
developer mailing list and the known vulnerabilities of
wget [2], [13].
B. Experimental Procedure
For each of the benchmark programs and policies de-
scribed in §IV-A1, we defined the benchmark’s policy in
the capweave policy language and applied capweave to
the program and policy. We also obtained a version of each
program that was manually modified to satisfy the policy.
In previous work, we manually rewrote bzip2, gzip,
and tcpdump to satisfy informal versions of the policies
described in §IV-A1. We recompiled these versions with the
LLVM compiler so that we could compare their runtime
overhead with the runtime overhead of the programs woven
by capweave. We manually instrumented the other three
benchmarks to satisfy each of their policies ourselves. The
woven and manually instrumented programs were compiled
with the default optimization of each benchmark (“-O2” for
each program). capweave was applied to optimized LLVM
bitcode.
We ran each benchmark on a set of test workloads that
exercised various behaviors of each benchmark. We ran
bzip2, gzip, php-cgi, tcpdump, and wget on the
test workloads included in the source distribution of each
program. We ran tar to archive its own source directory.
We ran each original benchmark, woven benchmark, and
manually rewritten benchmark on the benchmark’s test suite,
and compared the executions. In particular, we counted
the number of tests that each of the benchmark programs
passed and measured the runtime performance overhead of
the rewritten programs compared to the original benchmark.
Because the total time taken by each benchmark on the test
workloads supplied with the source was often less than a
second, we also measured performance on a larger, more
realistic workload.
To validate that the woven programs mitigated attacks
according to their policy, we introduced into each program
a “backdoor” into that attempted to carry out an attack
disallowed by the program’s policy. We then ran the wo-
ven program on an input that triggered the backdoor, and
observed that the backdoor failed to carry out its attack.
C. Analysis of Results
The results of our experiments are given in Tab. I.
(The performance numbers reported in Tab. I are from the
test workloads included in the source distribution of each
program. Performance on larger, more realistic workloads
is discussed below.) For each benchmark, Tab. I contains
three groups of measurements of our experience weaving
the benchmark. The first group (cols. 3–5) measures the
complexity of the policy for which the benchmark was
woven, and contains the number of lines of code in which
each policy is represented in our policy language, as well
as the size of the policy DFA constructed by capweave.
The number of lines of policy-language code (“Lines”)
indicates that the policy language supported by capweave
can express practical policies relatively concisely.
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Program Features Policy Size Weaver Woven-Program Performance
Prog. Name Size Lines States Alpha. Weaving Weaving Tests OK WeavedInterproc. Base (s) Weaved Hand capweave/
(KLOC) Size Time Memory Points Funcs. Overhd. Overhd. Hand (%)
bzip2-1.0.6 8 70 5 5,156 4m57s 0.3 GB 6 6 66 1 0.593 1.099 0.909 20.90
gzip-1.2.4 9 68 5 1,787 3m26s 0.2 GB 2 2 55 1 0.036 1.278 1.111 15.03
php-cgi-5.3.2 852 114 11 15,777 46m36s 25.3 GB 11 2 213 2 0.289 1.938 1.170 65.64
tar-1.25 108 49 8 143 0m08s 0.2 GB 1 1 62 2 0.156 21.917 13.301 64.78
tcpdump-4.1.1 87 52 6 223 0m09s 0.3 GB 29 27 88 1 1.328 1.224 0.981 24.77
wget-1.12 64 35 3 549 0m10s 0.2 GB 4 4 246 1 4.539 1.106 1.096 0.91
Table I
EXPERIMENTAL DATA FOR A SET OF BENCHMARKS PROGRAMS AND POLICIES. THE FIELDS OF THE TABLE ARE DISCUSSED IN §IV-C. IN THIS TABLE,
THE PERFORMANCE NUMBERS REPORTED ARE THOSE FROM THE TEST WORKLOADS INCLUDED IN THE SOURCE DISTRIBUTION OF EACH PROGRAM.
PERFORMANCE ON A LARGER, MORE REALISTIC WORKLOAD IS DISCUSSED IN §IV-C.
The second group of measurements in Tab. I (cols. 6–7)
measures the performance of capweave, and contains the
time and peak memory used by capweave. Each bench-
mark was woven on a server that has sixteen 2.4 GHz cores
and 32 GB of memory, although the capweave imple-
mentation executes serially. The running time (cf. “Weaving
Time”) and peak memory (cf. “Weaving Mem.”) indicate
that capweave could be included in the edit-compile-run
toolchain of many programs of small-to-medium size, and
could be included in the nightly build system of a program of
large size. The running time and peak memory also indicate
that the performance of capweave is strongly determined
by the size of the policy, in particular the size of the policy-
automaton alphabet, more than the size of the input program
(cf. “States”, “Alpha. Size”, “Weaving Time”, and “Weaving
Mem”).
The third group of measurements in Tab. I (cols. 8–
15) measures the performance of programs rewritten by
capweave, and contains the number of reference tests
that the unwoven (i.e., baseline) program passed (“Tests”),
the number of tests passed by the woven version of each
benchmark (“OK”), the number of program points at which
capweave added instrumentation (“Weaved Points”), the
number of functions that the benchmark executes in a
synchronous fork (“Interproc. Funcs.”), the runtime of
the baseline program (“Base”), the runtime of the woven
program expressed as a multiple of the runtime of the
baseline (“Weaved Overhead”), the runtime of the hand-
woven program as a multiple of the runtime of the baseline
(“Hand Overhead”), and the percentage overhead of the
runtime of the woven program over the runtime of the hand-
woven program (“capweave/ Hand”). The geometric mean
of all “capweave/ Hand” values is 1.298 (i.e., capweave
overhead is 29.8%). Each benchmark was run on a host
machine with eight 2.2 GHz processors and 6 GB of
memory, in a Capsicum virtual machine with one processor
and 2 GB of memory.
Each woven program behaved identically to its corre-
sponding hand-woven program on each test, and behaved
identically to its corresponding unwoven program on each
test, except for some tests included with tcpdump and
php-cgi. The woven tcpdump failed tests included with
tcpdump that gave a filepath to a file containing a secret
key for decrypting IPsec ESP packets, instead of giving the
secret key directly on the command line. The tcpdump
policy specified that the woven tcpdump should not be
able to open any file except for the input network device,
and hence could not open the file containing the secret key.
The woven php-cgi failed tests included with php-cgi
because no program can simultaneously satisfy the policy
specified by the MITLL group and pass all of the tests.
For example, the MITLL policy does not allow a PHP
program to create a new file in its current directory. The
woven php-cgi thus failed any test in which a program
tried to create a file for output in its current directory.
tcpdump and php-cgi thus illustrate one key aspect of
capweave: capweave allows a programmer to specify
the capabilities that a program should hold throughout an
execution, and automatically obtain a program that holds
the specified capabilities. However, a programmer still must
determine manually whether the capabilities specified by
a particular policy strike an acceptable balance between
the security requirements of the program and its original
functionality.
In future work, we plan to extend capweave to address
another of its current limitations, namely, essentially no
information is provided when policy weaving fails. We will
provide diagnostic aids designed to help the programmer
determine how a policy can be weakened so that policy
weaving will succeed.
The number of program points at which capweave
introduced instrumentation (i.e., “Weaved Points”) was small
relative to the size of each benchmark. Furthermore, the
number of functions that each woven benchmark executed
between a synchronous fork and join (i.e., “Interproc.
Funcs”) was small, and matched the number of functions
that each hand-woven benchmark executed between a syn-
chronous fork and join (and thus likely was minimal).
However, woven versions of bzip2, gzip, php-cgi, and
wget incurred noticeable overhead. We suspected that the
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woven versions of these programs would introduce the most
overhead on small workloads, because on such workloads,
the fixed overhead of executing a synchronous fork and
join dominates the overall runtime of the program.
To measure the performance of the woven programs
on larger workloads, we generated a 1 GB file of source
code from the Capsicum kernel source tree, and used it as
a workload for bzip2, gzip, and wget. The unwoven
bzip2 compressed the large file in 25m31s, and the woven
bzip2 compressed the large data with 4% overhead over
the baseline time. The unwoven gzip compressed the large
file in 5m27s, and the woven gzip compressed the large
data with 3% overhead over the baseline time. The unwoven
wget downloaded the large file from a server on the same
local network in 1m06s, and the woven wget downloaded
the large data with −4% overhead over the baseline time,
indicating that the overhead of the weaving is obscured by
noise introduced by network traffic. Thus, the maximum
overhead of the woven programs over unwoven programs
is 4%, and geometric mean of all the overheads is 1%. The
overhead for php-cgi depends entirely on how frequently
an input PHP script opens files over the course of its
execution.
The woven versions of tar and tcpdump introduced
noticeable overhead on operations that execute frequently on
all workloads, such as a subprocedure in tar that reads data
into a buffer, or a subprocedure in tcpdump that resolves
network addresses to names. The per-operation overhead
induces an enormous overhead in tar in particular, and
illustrates a third limitation of capweave: some policies
induce capweave to instrument costly primitives, such as
fork, at program points that induce considerable overhead,
when capweave potentially may be able to instrument
other program points that induce much less overhead. The
overhead of the hand-woven program, while less than the
overhead of the woven program, is still considerable: in
our experience, weaving tar efficiently is a difficult prob-
lem, and one that could benefit significantly from further
automatic-tool support. In future work, we hope to address
this limitation by extending capweave to use a cost metric,
and generalizing the game solver to find optimal strategies
to quantitative games [22].
V. RELATED WORK
Capability systems: Karger [23] introduced a capa-
bility system that mitigates the effects of an attack by
a malicious program run on the system. The Capsicum
operating system [10] provides security primitives to support
isolating components of a program in sandboxes that run
with different capabilities based on UNIX file descriptors.
This paper describes the capweave tool, which greatly
eases the burden of using Capsicum by allowing policies to
be stated as separate policy specifications that capweave
weaves into the program automatically.
Security monitors: Operating systems that provide
security system calls, such as Capsicum, HiStar [11],
Wedge [24] etc., allow an application developer to define
program-specific policies (where the nature of the policy
depends on the security primitives offered by the operating
system). In contrast, Mandatory Access Control (MAC) op-
erating systems, such as [25]–[27] only support system-wide
policies described in terms of standard system events. Such
policies cannot refer to important events in the execution
of a particular program, but many practical policies can
only be defined in terms of such events [28]. UNIX can
monitor programs to ensure that they satisfy policies if the
program correctly uses the setuid system call, but in
general this approach suffers the same shortcomings as MAC
systems. In comparison, systems with security primitives
allow an application to signal key events in its execution to
the operating system. Watson has described the challenges
of developing an access-control system, and has surveyed
recent implementations of such systems [29].
An Inline Reference Monitor (IRM) rewriter takes a policy
expressed as an automaton and instruments a target program
with an IRM, which executes in the same memory space as
the program, and halts the program if it attempts to perform
some sequence of actions that would violate the policy [28],
[30]. Edit automata [31] generalize IRMs by also supressing
or adding security-sensitive events to ensure that the program
satisfies a policy. Because an IRM (or edit automaton)
executes in the same memory space as the program that it
monitors, it can enforce policies defined over arbitrary events
in the execution of the program. However, for the same
reason, an IRM can only monitor the execution of managed
code. In comparison, systems with security primitives can
safely and efficiently monitor programs composed largely
of unmanaged code [10], [11].
Writing programs for security monitors: Prior work
on programming aids for systems with security primitives
automatically verifies that a program instrumented to use the
Flume OS [9] primitives enforces a high-level policy [32],
automatically instruments programs to use the primitives of
the HiStar OS to satisfy a policy [33], and automatically
instruments programs [32] to use the primitives of the Flume
OS [9]. However, the languages of policies used in the
approaches presented in [33], [34] are not temporal and
cannot clearly be applied to other systems with security
primitives. The weaving algorithm presented in this paper
applies a known automata-theoretic weaving algorithm [15].
The main contribution of this paper is to describe how the
automata-theoretic algorithm can be applied as an engine to
rewrite programs for a practical capability system.
In the privsep project [35], OpenSSH was rewritten
manually to execute using a trusted, privileged parent pro-
cess and an unprivileged child process. Privman [36] is
a library that a programmer can use to manually com-
partmentalize a UNIX daemon into high and low-privilege
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processes. Previous work [37], [38] automatically partitions
programs so that high and low confidentiality data are
processed by separate processes, or on separate hosts. The
SOAPP project [39] proposes a semi-automatic technique
in which a programmer annotates a program with a hypo-
thetical sandbox, and a program analysis validates that the
sandbox does not introduce unexpected program behavior.
The SOAAP approach is similar in spirit to [32], which
uses model checking to verify that a programmer-proposed
partitioning and set of calls to security primitives satisfies
a given policy. In contrast, capweave automatically infers
where to invoke library functions that cause the program to
execute in different processes (if necessary), and rewrites the
program accordingly.
Skalka and Smith [40] present an algorithm that takes a
Java program instrumented with capability security checks,
and attempts to show statically that some checks are always
satisfied. Hamlen et al. [41] verify that programs rewritten by
an IRM rewriter are correct. Thus, the work in both of those
papers concerns identifying superfluous capability checks in
managed programs, whereas our work concerns how to infer
the correct placement of primitives to restrict the capabilities
of unmanaged programs.
Safety games: Safety games have been studied as a
framework for synthesizing reactive programs and control
mechanisms [42]–[45]. Previous work describes algorithms
that take a safety game, determine which player can always
win the game, and synthesize a winning strategy for the
winning player [44], [45]. The key contribution of our work
is to demonstrate that such game-theoretic problems can be
applied in practice to rewrite secure programs.
VI. CONCLUSION
New operating systems, such as the Capsicum capability
system, define powerful system-level primitives for secure
programming, but such primitives are non-trivial to use. This
paper presents a policy-weaver for Capsicum, capweave,
that takes from a programmer an uninstrumented program
and a high-level policy that describes correct behavior of the
program. capweave automatically infers where to invoke
security primitives and rewrites the program accordingly.
In practice, capweave produces programs that match the
behavior and performance of programs manually modified
by an expert. capweave is designed so that a Capsicum Ar-
chitect can easily add, remove, or update new programming
libraries as they continue to be developed.
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VII. APPENDIX
A. From Capsicum Semantics to a Transducer Model
capweave takes as input a program and policy, con-
structs VPA models of the program, policy, and Capsicum,
and provides these models to the policy-weaver generator.
In this section, we describe the construction of the models
in more detail. We first define the automata that the weaver
generator takes as input.
A deterministic visibly-pushdown automaton (VPA) is a
stack machine that reads distinct sets of actions that cause it
to modify that top state on its stack, push a new state onto
its stack, and pop the top state from its stack. [18]
Defn. 3. A deterministic (ΣI ,ΣC ,ΣR)-visibly-pushdown
automaton V = (ΣI ,ΣC ,ΣR, Q, q0, QF , τI , τC , τR) is a
tuple, where
• ΣI is the alphabet of internal actions.
• ΣC is the alphabet of call actions.
• ΣR is the alphabet of return actions. ΣI , ΣC and ΣR
are mutually disjoint.
• Q is the set of states.
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state.
• QF ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states.
• τI : Q× ΣI → Q is the internal transition function.
• τC : Q×Σc → (Q×Q) is the call transition function.
• τR : Q×Q×ΣR → Q is the return transition function.
A visibly-pushdown transducer (VPT) is a VPA extended
with an alphabet symbols, which outputs a symbol from on
each transition.
Defn. 4. A deterministic (ΣI ,ΣC ,ΣR,ΣO)-
visibly-pushdown transducer (VPT) T =
(ΣI ,ΣC ,ΣR,ΣO, Q, q0, QF , τI , τC , τR) is a tuple, where
• ΣI is the alphabet of internal actions.
• ΣC is the alphabet of call actions.
• ΣR is the alphabet of return actions.
• ΣO is the alphabet of output actions. ΣI , ΣC , ΣR and
ΣO are mutually disjoint.
• Q is a set of states.
• q0 ∈ Q is the initial state.
• QF ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states.
• τI : Q × ΣI → Q × ΣO is the internal transition
function.
• τC : Q × ΣC → Q × Q × ΣO is the call transition
function.
• τR : Q×Q→ Q×ΣO is the return transition function.
The input of an automata-theoretic policy-weaving prob-
lem is a program VPA defined over an alphabet of program
actions, a policy VPA defined over an alphabet of program
actions paired with privileges, and a system transducer that
maps a sequence of program actions and primitives to a
sequence of privileges held by the program [15].
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Defn. 5. An input of an automata-theoretic
policy-weaving problem is a tuple I =
(ΣI ,ΣC ,ΣR, R,ΣPI ,ΣPC ,ΣPR, P,Q, S), where
• ΣI is the alphabet of program internal actions.
• ΣC is the alphabet of program call actions.
• ΣR is the alphabet of program return actions.
• R is the set of privileges.
• ΣPI is the alphabet of internal primitives.
• ΣPC is the alphabet of primitive calls.
• ΣPR is the alphabet of primitive returns.
• The program model VP is a (ΣI ,ΣC ,ΣR-VPA.
• The policy model VQ is a (ΣI ×R,ΣC ×R,ΣR×R)-
VPA.
• The system model S is a (ΣI ∪ΣPI ,ΣC ∪ΣPC ,ΣR ∪
ΣPR, R)-VPT.
capweave takes a program P and policy
Q, and constructs a policy-weaving problem
P = (ΣI ,ΣC ,ΣR, R,ΣPI ,ΣPI,ΣPC ,ΣPR,P,Q, S),
defined as follows. Let LabelsP be the set of control labels
that occur in P . Let ΣI = LabelsP (§III-A2), ΣC = ∅,
ΣR = ∅. Let OpensP be the set of open-sites that occur
in P . Then ΣPI = {cap enter} ∪ {limitfd(o,R) | o ∈
OpensP , R ⊆ Rights}, ΣPC = {fork}, and
ΣPR = {join}.
To construct the program-model VPA VP , capweave
constructs the control-flow graph of the P , and from the
control-flow graph, constructs VP using standard techniques
P [18]. For simplicity, in this section, we have defined the
alphabets of program calls ΣC and program returns ΣR to be
empty. However, our actual implementation of capweave
defines ΣC and ΣR from the calls and returns of P , in order
to construct a more precise model of P .
The policy Q is a regular expression over the alpha-
bet LabelsP × proccap. To construct the policy VPA VQ,
capweave constructs the deterministic finite automaton
(DFA) that accepts that language of Q, and from the DFA,
directly constructs VQ [18].
The Capsicum system transducer S =
(ΣI ,ΣC ,ΣR,ΣO, Q, q0, QF , τI , τC , τR) is constructed
from the Capsicum semantics as follows:
• The internal alphabet is the set of program labels and
internal primitives: Σi = LabelsP ∪ ΣPI .
• The call alphabet is the set of call primitives: ΣC =
ΣPC .
• The return alphabet is the set of return primitives: ΣR =
ΣPR.
• The output alphabet is the set of process-capability
states: ΣO = proccap.
• The set of states is the set of process-capability states:
Q = proccap.
• The initial state is the process state that defines the
initial capability state ci (§III-A3): q0 = (True, ∅).
• The accepting states are all states: QF = Q.
• The internal transition function is defined by the in-
terpretation of descriptor instructions and the interpre-
tation of Capsicum primitives: for q ∈ Q, i ∈ Σi, if
i ≡ d : x := open(y), then τI(q, i) = q′, where
ιdJiK(∅, [q]) = (p′, [q′]).
• The call transition function is defined by the interpreta-
tion of the fork primitives: for q ∈ Q, τC(q, fork) =
(q, q).
• The return transition function is defined by the in-
terpretation of the join primitive: for q, r ∈ Q,
τR(q, r, join) = q
′, where ιpJjoinK([q; r]) = [q′].
capweave applies the policy-weaver generator to the
policy-weaving problem P defined by the program model,
policy, and Capsicum model. If the weaver generator solves
P , then it constructs an instrumentation transducer TI .
capweave uses TI to instrument the program P , as de-
scribed in App. VII-B.
B. From an Instrumentation Transducer to a Woven Pro-
gram
From an input program P and policy Q, capweave
constructs an automata-theoretic weaving problem P
(App. VII-A), and gives P to the policy weaver genera-
tor. If the weaver generator solves P , then it constructs
an instrumentation transducer TI , which directs when an
instrumented program should invoke Capsicum primitives.
In this section, we describe how capweave uses TI to
instrument an IMP program. We then describe how the
practical implementation of capweave instruments LLVM
programs.
capweave takes an IMP program P and instrumen-
tation transducer TI and instruments P by (1) updat-
ing a state variable sthat maintains a state of TI and
(2) checking the value of sto determine what primitive
to execute in each step of its execution. Let TI =
(ΣI ,ΣC ,ΣR,ΣO, Q, q0, QF , τI , τC , τR). Then the instru-
mentation generated for program action a, I(a), is defined
as follows:
I ′(a, []) = x := noop
I ′(a, q :: qs) = d := s− i(q);
nz := iszero(d);
nz ? τI(q, a);
I(a, qs)
I(a) = I ′(a,Q)
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